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Essays 
THE ACADEMIC EXPERT BEFORE  
CONGRESS: OBSERVATIONS AND LESSONS 
FROM BILL VAN ALSTYNE’S TESTIMONY 
NEAL DEVINS† 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1968 and 1985, Professor Bill Van Alstyne testified on 
seventeen occasions before congressional committees.1 That 
testimony, as well as Van Alstyne’s writings on academic freedom, 
serve as a template for academics who want to speak out on public 
issues. Van Alstyne not only wrote about academics’ fiduciary duty to 
maintain “standard[s] of professional integrity,”2 but also served as 
living proof that an academic could live by this creed. His testimony 
 
Copyright © 2005 by Neal Devins. 
 † Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and 
Mary. Ever since my first year in law school, I have admired Professor Bill Van Alstyne. 
Initially, Van Alstyne’s A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1,  
convinced me that I could survive my constitutional law class. Over time, his writings  
helped shape my scholarship. His writings on academic freedom, for example, figured 
prominently in my decision to write an article about the need for law professors to have  
some expertise on a topic before signing joint letters. Soon after that article was  
published, Van Alstyne spent a memorable semester at William and Mary. I truly enjoyed 
getting to know him and very much resisted his departure. Little did I know that he would  
soon become one of my favorite colleagues! In writing this Essay, I benefitted from 
conversations with several individuals who have either worked for or testified before 
congressional committees. Thanks, in particular, to Bill Eskridge, Lou Fisher, Mike Glennon, 
Nelson Lund, Chris Schroeder, Bill Van Alstyne, and John Yoo for sharing their  
impressions with me. Thanks also to Keith Whittington for helping me think about the issues 
discussed in this Essay and to Tim Castor, Aaron Kimbler, and Jason Kirwan for truly 
outstanding research help. 
 1. For a list of these seventeen appearances (including information about articles Van 
Alstyne  has written on the subjects he has testified about), see infra App. A. 
 2. William Van Alstyne, The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue 
of Civil Liberty, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 71 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 
1972). 
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was both scholarly and nonpartisan. Starting in 1986, however, 
Congress became less and less interested in hearing from Van 
Alstyne. He has testified only twice since 1985 and not at all since 
1999.3 
Why have congressional committees largely lost interest in 
hearing from Van Alstyne? For reasons I detail, attitudes in Congress 
toward academic experts have undergone a sea change. Over the past 
twenty-five years, committee staffers have increasingly turned away 
from nonpartisan, unpredictable academic witnesses like Bill Van 
Alstyne. The ever-growing divide that separates Democrats and 
Republicans explains this phenomenon. 
Changes in Congress have been matched by changes in the 
academy. Today’s academics appear increasingly partisan, 
increasingly political. Rather than defend (through word and deed) 
traditional understandings of academic expertise, they are 
increasingly willing to feign expertise to stake out positions on hot-
button political issues.4 
Let me begin by sharing a couple of stories—one from Van 
Alstyne and one from another friend of mine. Both stories center on 
their respective experiences before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
in the past few years. These stories, I think, put into focus the issues 
that this Essay will examine. Indeed, my decision to write this Essay 
was triggered by the quite different reactions that Van Alstyne and 
my other friend had toward Judiciary Committee Chair Orrin Hatch’s 
apparent efforts to use committee hearings to advance partisan goals. 
In 1999, after being asked by the committee to comment on 
proposed flag burning legislation, Van Alstyne wrote a letter in which 
he concluded that the act did not honestly serve a “constitutionally 
proper concern.”5 This position was contrary to Senator Hatch’s 
political preferences, and the Senator concluded that the letter ought 
not to be published. Provoked, Van Alstyne distributed the letter to 
all members of the committee and, ultimately, Senator Patrick Leahy 
inserted the letter into the published hearings. In explaining why he 
 
 3. See infra  App. A. 
 4. See infra notes 106–15 and accompanying text. 
 5. An Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Authorizing Congress to 
Prohibit the Physical Desecration of the Flag of the United States: Hearing on S.J. Res. 14 Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 142, 146 (1999) (letter to Senator Orrin G. 
Hatch, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, from Professor William Van Alstyne). 
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had circulated the letter to the committee, Van Alstyne explained 
that he thought it wrong to squelch his views for partisan reasons.6 
Three years later, Senator Hatch asked another friend of mine to 
testify. Hatch wanted testimony that would back up his position in an 
ongoing controversy involving the George W. Bush White House. My 
friend testified in a way that supported Hatch’s views, prompting 
another witness at the hearing to tell my friend that Hatch owed him 
for preparing helpful testimony on short notice. Although I am 
certain that my friend worked diligently in preparing his testimony 
and that he believed in the correctness of his testimony, it is also clear 
to me that my friend understood and was not especially surprised by 
the fact that Hatch’s staff contacted him because they thought he 
would prepare testimony that bolstered their position. 
These stories show that today’s academics see congressional 
hearings as increasingly partisan and politicized. Many of the experts 
now called before Congress consider themselves witnesses for 
Republicans or Democrats; that is, they see Congress as a highly 
partisan institution and the academic witness as someone who helps 
advance the agenda of one or the other party. Although partisanship 
certainly played a role in earlier hearings, today’s Congress is much 
less interested in hearing from nonpartisan experts. 
This Essay uses Bill Van Alstyne’s experiences before Congress 
as a lens through which to contemplate larger changes in both 
Congress and the academy. Part I highlights Van Alstyne’s view that 
academics must “answer at a professional level for the ethical 
integrity of [their] work”7 and, correspondingly, explains how Van 
Alstyne’s numerous appearances before congressional committees 
satisfied that high standard. Part II examines the reasons why an 
increasingly polarized Congress is less interested in hearing from 
academic experts, especially experts who are not readily identifiable 
as reliable “Democrat” or “Republican” witnesses. Finally, Part III 
discusses changes in the academy, especially the willingness of 
academics to sign joint letters and advertisements and to use a more 
flexible definition of academic expertise than that Bill Van Alstyne 
employed.  
 
 6. Bill Van Alstyne shared this story with me in a conversation that we had in October 
2003. 
 7. Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 76. 
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I.  LIVING BY EXAMPLE: LINKING BILL VAN ALSTYNE’S WRITINGS 
ON ACADEMIC EXPERTISE TO HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESS 
Academic freedom protects “the pursuit of truth by those 
persons whose lives are dedicated to . . . extending the realm of 
knowledge.”8 In his numerous writings on the subject, Bill Van 
Alstyne emphasizes that academic freedom is a “contingent 
privilege,” one that places affirmative duties on academic experts to 
maintain professional standards.9 Under this view, academic freedom 
is a quid pro quo. By making sure that they and others are making 
“ethical use” of their academic freedom, academics gain a unique 
liberty, one “marked by the absence of restraints or threats against its 
exercise.”10 For this very reason, Van Alstyne  argues that the 
“maintenance of academic freedom contemplates an accountability in 
respect to [the professional integrity of] academic investigations and 
utterances.”11 
Likewise, Van Alstyne contends that academics are expected to 
meet the “fiduciary” standards that justify academic freedom and 
otherwise honor the “special critical role of the professional 
teacher.”12 When expressing an “expert opinion” through their 
writings or public appearances, academics must speak in their own 
voice and not follow another’s script.13 
 
 8. RUSSELL KIRK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: AN ESSAY IN DEFINITION 3 (1955).  
 9. E.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 76. In addition to these writings, Bill has held 
leadership roles at the American Association of University Professors (general counsel from 
1972–74 and 1988–90; national president from 1974–76) and at the American Association of 
American Law Schools (chair of the committee on academic freedom from 1981–83). 
 10. Van Alstyne, supra  note 2, at 71. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 76. Accordingly, academics ought not see themselves as “supercitizens,” entitled 
to speak out on issues by virtue of their status. The ways of the scholar, as Professor Alexander 
Bickel put it, “appeal to men’s better natures” because they are about thinking, training, and 
insulation, not the emotionalism of “the moment’s hue and cry.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25–26 (2d ed. 1986). That is not to say that academics cannot 
speak out on subjects that they care passionately about. But it is to say, as Van Alstyne puts it, 
that they might answer at a “professional level for the ethical integrity of [their] work.” Van 
Alstyne, supra  note 2, at 76.  
 13. Professor Arthur Lovejoy, whom Van Alstyne cites favorably, puts it this way: 
academic freedom “is rendered impossible if the work of the investigator is shackled by the 
requirement that his conclusions shall never seriously deviate” from those who control 
universities. Arthur O. Lovejoy , Academic Freedom, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 384, 384 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1930), quoted in Van Alstyne, 
supra note 2, at 77.  
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In his seventeen appearances before congressional committees 
(principally the House and Senate Judiciary Committees),14 Van 
Alstyne consistently adhered to the high standards enunciated in his 
writings. Not only was his testimony consistently scholarly, but it also 
reflected the academic’s responsibility to speak “truth to power.”15 
Rather than align himself with either political party, Van Alstyne 
thought it more important to make use of a methodology that favored 
neither.16 
Before detailing the ways in which Van Alstyne’s testimony was 
both scholarly and nonpartisan, let me say a few words on another of 
its distinguishing features: Van Alstyne’s eloquence. In hearing after 
hearing, Van Alstyne has demonstrated his extraordinary gifts as a 
speaker. Here are two of my favorite examples. In 1970, Van Alstyne 
testified against Nixon Supreme Court nominee George Harrold 
Carswell. Following his testimony, Indiana Democrat Birch Bayh 
commented that he found Van Alstyne ’s testimony “particularly 
revealing” because they “did not see eye to eye on the previous 
[Nixon] nominee,” Clement Haynsworth, on whose behalf Van 
Alstyne had testified.17 South Carolina Republican Strom Thurmond 
then suggested that Senator Bayh “did not listen” to the earlier 
testimony. Without missing a beat, Van Alstyne interjected: “[W]ith 
regard to Senator Bayh’s predicament, at least, I am reminded of a 
recollection of Justice Frankfurter who said that it is so seldom that 
wisdom ever comes, we ought not to be reluctant though it comes 
late.”18 
Van Alstyne’s talents were also on full display in 1991, when he 
testified on whether Congress needs to declare war before the 
president can commit troops abroad. At that time, the first President 
Bush had just sent 350,000 troops overseas in anticipation of armed 
conflict with Iraq.19 Not one to mince words, Van Alstyne argued that 
“the President must secure authorization from Congress for the 
 
 14. See infra App. A. 
 15. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Intellectuals’ Role: Truth to Power?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1983, 
at A28.  
 16. See infra  notes 32–41 and accompanying  text. 
 17. Nomination of George Harrold Carswell, of Florida, to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary , 91st 
Cong. 138 (1970) (statement of Senator Birch Bayh). 
 18. Id. (statement of Professor William van Alstyne).  
 19. Eric Schmitt, Mideast Tensions; U.S. Declares Missions to Iraq are “Being Used,” N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1990, at A15. 
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enforcement of our demands by war” and if he did not it would 
“mark the boldest usurpation of power by a President we will have 
seen in this country since Watergate and it should be treated in the 
same way.”20 Responding to Van Alstyne ’s suggestion that unilateral 
presidential war making was impeachable, Pennsylvania Republican 
Arlen Specter posed a hypothetical in which a Senate filibuster 
prevented Congress from declaring war. Van Alstyne did more than 
stand his ground. He turned Senator Specter’s hypothetical on its 
head, claiming “by way of analogy” that the hypothetical is “no 
different” than the president unilaterally raising taxes against the 
backdrop of a Senate filibuster when “in the President’s view the 
national fiscal crisis imperatively requires an increase in taxation and 
in his view we will face a horrendous depression, unless we raise a tax 
of a certain kind.”21 Van Alstyne then concluded, with a flourish, that 
“[t]he Congress must act, in order for the dog of war to be unloosed. 
The President may not unchain the dog.”22 
In testifying against unilateral presidential war making and 
against Carswell, Van Alstyne backed up the views of Democratic 
opponents of Presidents Richard Nixon and George H.W. Bush. On 
other occasions, however, Van Alstyne has defended the prerogatives 
of Republican presidents. Indeed, Van Alstyne ’s testimony—taken as 
a whole—reveals that he cannot be typecast. He has leant support to 
both political parties; he has backed both liberal and conservative 
positions; he has testified both in support of and in opposition to 
presidential prerogatives. Consider the following  examples of Van 
Alstyne’s nonpartisanship. First, as noted, Van Alstyne testified in 
favor of Clement Haynsworth and against George Carswell.23 Second, 
on different occasions, Van Alstyne praised and criticized the 
leadership of the Reagan Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division. 
In 1981, he contended that the Division was not sufficiently zealous in 
 
 20. The Constitutional Roles of Congress and the President in Declaring and Waging War, 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary , 102d Cong. 194 (1991) [hereinafter 
Constitutional Roles Hearing ] (statement of Professor William Van Alstyne). It should be noted 
that Bill was “not a critic of [the president’s] policy” and believed that the President had been 
“wonderfully successful in international diplomacy.” Id. at 211 (testimony of Professor William 
Van Alstyne). For additional discussion of Van Alstyne’s willingness to stake out a position 
before Congress that does not necessarily square with his policy preferences, see infra notes 36–
41 and accompanying text. 
 21. Constitutional Roles Hearing, supra note 20, at 212 (testimony of Professor William 
Van Alstyne). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
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its pursuit of racially motivated violence;24 in 1985, he supported the 
nomination of then-Civil Rights Div ision head Brad Reynolds to 
become Associate Attorney General.25 Finally, on hot-button social 
issues, Van Alstyne both supported and opposed conservative 
initiatives. In the early 1980s, he testified against two proposals 
backed by social conservatives. In 1981, he concluded that lawmaker 
efforts to decree that life begins at conception were “unconstitutional 
and wholly unworthy of Congress”;26 in 1982, he vigorously opposed a 
constitutional amendment to permit voluntary school prayer, 
concluding that the amendment “install[s] the first seeds of theocracy 
into our government institutions.”27 During the same period, 
however, Van Alstyne testified against race preferences, arguing that 
affirmative action creates a “highly destructive competition for racial 
spoils” and that legislation should be enacted “which would make 
quite clear that no variety of racial discrimination under the auspices 
of the Government of the United States will be allowed at all.”28 
One final example: impeachment. In 1991, Van Alstyne 
disappointed Republicans by arguing that unilateral presidential war 
making was an impeachable offense.29 Eight years later, however, 
Van Alstyne was a Republican witness in House hearings on 
President Clinton’s impeachment. Depicting the president’s conduct 
as “disreputable,” he said that he would be “disappointed,” 
“astonished,” and “surprised” by any member who did not think 
 
 24. Racially Motivated Violence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary , 97th Cong. 387 (1981) (testimony of Professor William Van 
Alstyne) (discussing the Division’s “puzzling conservative attitude” toward existing federal 
criminal civil rights statutes). 
 25. Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be Associate Attorney General of the 
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary , 99th Cong. 169–70 (1985) 
(testimony of Professor William Van Alstyne) (suggesting that Reynolds’ opponents, unlike 
“the overwhelming majority of Americans,” were uninterested in giving the administration a 
“fair opportunity” to pursue policies that would prohibit all types of “racial discrimination,” 
including affirmative action). 
 26. The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers 
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary , 97th Cong. 280 (1981) [hereinafter Human Life Bill 
Hearings] (letter to Representative Don Edwards, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, from Professor William Van Alstyne).  
 27. Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Permit Voluntary Prayer: Hearings Before the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary , 97th Cong. 468 (1982) (testimony of Professor William Van 
Alstyne). 
 28. Affirmative Action and Equal Protection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary , 97th Cong. 85 (1981) (testimony of Professor 
William Van Alstyne). 
 29. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
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there was a plausible case for “impeachment within the definition of 
high crimes and misdemeanors.”30 No doubt, those comments did not 
sit well with Democrats. Moments later, however, Van Alstyne also 
undermined Republican efforts to push for a full blown impeachment 
trial. Arguing that the nation would be better served by Congress 
finding “a suitable means to express a sense of disappointment, if not 
despair or contempt,”31 Van Alstyne thought public censure more 
appropriate than a trial. 
Van Alstyne refused to take sides for a reason. That reason, as 
suggested above, is Van Alstyne’s belief that academics cannot simply 
be advocates for either their personal beliefs or the views of one or 
another political party. Instead, when academics hold themselves out 
as experts, they have an affirmative duty to “answer at a professional 
level for the ethical integrity of [their] work.”32 In his testimony 
before Congress, Van Alstyne lived up to the high standards detailed 
in his writings on academic freedom. 
In addition to being nonpartisan, Van Alstyne’s testimony was a 
model of scholarly expertise. In his seventeen appearances before 
congressional committees, Van Alstyne repeatedly proved himself an 
expert on a range of subjects. In part, this expertise was tied to his 
academic writings. Not counting the three times that he testified 
about nominations to the Supreme Court or high ranking Justice 
Department positions, Van Alstyne had written articles related to the 
subject of his testimony on thirteen of fourteen occasions.33 Because 
an academic witness need not have written on a subject to have 
sufficient expertise to testify,34 what is more significant is that Van 
Alstyne’s testimony is consistently scholarly. He almost always makes 
 
 30. Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary , 105th Cong. 237–38 (1998) [hereinafter 
Impeachment Hearing] (testimony of Professor William Van Alstyne). For a more detailed 
treatment of Van Alstyne’s views on impeachment, see Susan Low Bloch, 54 Duke L.J. 1659 
(2005). 
 31. Impeachment Hearing , supra note 30, at 238 (testimony of Professor William Van 
Alstyne).  
 32. Van Alstyne, supra  note 2, at 76. 
 33. The only exception was Van Alstyne’s 1973 testimony on whether Congress could 
reduce the compensation of the Attorney General to make an end run around the Emoluments 
Clause. To Reduce the Compensation of the Office of Attorney General: Hearing on S. 2673 
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 47 (1973). For a list of articles related to 
Bill’s congressional appearances, see infra  App. A. 
 34. See generally  Neal Devins, Misunderstood, 82 B.U. L. REV. 293 (2002) (summarizing 
my views on what it means to be an academic expert).  
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use of a methodology that he has developed and perfected, a 
methodology that places primary emphasis on the constitutional text 
and secondary relevance on the framers’ intent and historical 
commentary.35 
Van Alstyne, finally, demonstrated his commitment to the 
academic ethic by reaching conclusions that did not align with his 
personal views.36 In 1976, Van Alstyne testified that proposed 
legislation allowing for the use of electronic surveillance was 
constitutional.37 In his testimony, Van Alstyne also noted that he 
disapproved of the bill and hoped that Congress would protect 
against improper applications of electronic surveillance by enacting 
more narrowly tailored legislation.38 Likewise, in 1981, Van Alstyne 
provided qualified support for legislation he strongly opposed. When 
testifying on proposed legislation to strip the Supreme Court of 
appellate jurisdiction over school prayer and abortion, Van Alstyne 
argued that the scope of congressional power was uncertain and, 
consequently, that Congress might constitutionally limit the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.39 He minced no words, however, in 
explaining why such legislation would be unsound. Noting that 
Congress’s proposal would leave it to state courts to sort out the 
constitutionality of highly divisive issues, Van Alstyne remarked that 
“this Congress ought itself not welcome a fragmented Constitution of 
the United States of no national supremacy at all, but merely a 
ludicrous document of vagrant ‘meanings’ unreviewably determined 
 
 35. For an entertaining elaboration of Van Alstyne’s methodology, see Garrett Epps, The 
Van Alstyne Method, 54 DUKE L.J. 1553 (2005). 
 36. Van Alstyne’s willingness to place “principle” ahead of “personal preferences” extends 
to his written scholarship. Professor Jesse Choper spoke about this trait at the conference on 
which this symposium is based, noting that Bill’s scholarship was “consistently grounded in 
principle, not personal preferences, wherever these principles lead.” Oral remarks of Professor 
Jesse Choper, University of California, Berkeley, Address at the Fifth Annual Public Law 
Conference: Honoring the Scholarship and Contributions of William van Alstyne (Apr. 16–17, 
2005). 
 37. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearings on H.R. 12750 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary , 94th 
Cong. 55 (1976) (statement of Professor Willia m Van Alstyne). 
 38. Id. at 59 (statement of Professor William Van Alstyne). 
 39. Oversight Hearings to Define the Scope of the Senate’s Authority Under Article III of the 
Constitution to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary , 97th Cong. 99 (1981) (testimony of 
Professor William Van Alstyne) (noting that there are no explicit limitations within the 
Exceptions Clause on Congress’s power to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction). 
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by state courts.”40 Van Alstyne’s willingness to provide lawmakers 
with the academic arguments that they needed to pursue a proposal 
that he disliked is remarkable,41 another indication that Van Alstyne 
seems the gold standard for academic witnesses. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTION AND CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEES: WHY CONGRESS HAS LOST INTEREST IN  
HEARING FROM NONPARTISAN EXPERTS 
Why is it that Bill Van Alstyne testified seventeen times between 
1968 and 1985 and only two times after 1985? In all nineteen of his 
appearances before congressional committees, Van Alstyne was 
eloquent, scholarly, principled, and nonpartisan. Likewise, Van 
Alstyne’s stature among academics remained strong after 1985.42 In 
other words, the fact that congressional committees have largely lost 
interest in Van Alstyne appears tied to changes in Congress, not 
changes in Van Alstyne’s performance or reputation. In this Part, I 
examine this issue. By calling attention to fundamental changes in 
Congress, I argue that today’s Congress does not want to hear from 
nonpartisan constitutional experts and, more generally, is not 
especially interested in hearing about the Constitution.43 
Mapping Changes in Congress. Today’s Congress is a much 
different place than the Congress of 1968–1985. In 1968, for example, 
George Wallace justified his third-party bid for the presidency by 
claiming that there was not a “dime’s worth of difference” between 
 
 40. Id. at 134 (statement of Professor William Van Alstyne). 
 41. See infra Part III (discussing recent efforts by academics to influence political 
discourse). 
 42. On March 12, 2005, I did a Westlaw search using the terms “(William or Bill) w/1 
(“Van Alstyne” or “vanalstyne”).” From January 1, 1986, through March 12, 2005, Van 
Alstyne’s work was cited 1543 times—placing him in the upper echelon of legal academics 
during that period.  
 43. With Professor Keith Whittington, I am now engaged in a research project on 
congressional committee consideration of constitutional questions. A portion of that research 
was presented at “Constitutionalism and Legislatures,” a summer 2004 conference sponsored by 
the University of Alberta’s Centre for Constitutional Studies. See Keith Whittington, Neal 
Devins, & Hutch Hicken, The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971–2000, in 
LEGISLATURES AND CONSTITUTIONS: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
STATE (Tsvi Kahana & Richard Baumann eds., forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 1, on file with 
the Duke Law Journal). The analysis in this Part is informed by that research. At the same time, 
this research project is still a work in progress and, as such, may reach somewhat different 
conclusions than the ones that I advance in this Essay. 
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Democrats and Republicans.44 Today, however, the forces that 
pushed the Democratic and Republican parties toward the center 
have dissipated. The liberal “Rockefeller Republicans” and 
conservative “Southern Democrats” have given way to an era of 
ideological polarization in Congress.45 In the South, conservative 
Democrats were replaced with southern Republicans.46 By losing 
seats (and conservative members) in the South, Democrats became 
fewer in number and more liberal. For their part, Republicans moved 
to the right. In part, the addition of southern Republicans made the 
party more conservative.47 Equally important, the ascendancy of 
“Ronald Reagan’s GOP” in 1980 was linked to the defeat of the 
moderate-to-liberal wing of the Republican Party.48 
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that “[t]he polarization 
between the political parties is, perhaps, one of the most obvious and 
recognizable trends in Congress during the last twenty years.”49 
Measures of ideology reveal that, in the House of Representatives, 
the most liberal Republican is more conservative than the most 
conservative Democrat.50 In the Senate, with the exception of Zel 
 
 44. Richard Pearson, Former Alabama Governor George C. Wallace Dies, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 14, 1998, at A1. 
 45. See David Von Drehle, Political Split Is Pervasive: Clash of Cultures Is Driven by 
Targeted Appeals and Reinforced by Geography , WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2004, at A1 (suggesting 
that the divide between the two major political parties reflects the ide ological division in the 
United States). 
 46. See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and 
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
305, 306 (2003) (tracking the exponential growth of southern Republicans as a percentage of 
southern representatives in the House of Representatives). 
 47. See id. (suggesting that the increase in the number of southern Republicans helped 
make the Republican Party more conservative). 
 48. See Kate O’Beirne, Rockefeller Republicans Take Manhattan, NAT’L. REV. ONLINE, 
July 7, 2004, at www.nationalreview.com/kob/obeirne200407070839.asp (noting that, in 2004, 
Rockefeller Republicans were no more than “mavericks and dissidents who represent a 
minority in Ronald Reagan’s GOP” and complaining of the “decision to showcase [these] rogue 
elephants as representativ es of the modern Republican Party” at the 2004 Republican 
Convention).  
 49. Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderate: Party Polarization in the 
Modern Congress 5 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 50. See 108th House Rank Ordering at http://voteview.com/hou108.htm (last updated Aug. 
23, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that the “two parties are perfectly 
separated in the liberal-conservative ordering” and providing an ideological ranking of House 
members–beginning with the most liberal and ending with the most conservative). For an article 
detailing the methodology employed in these rankings, see Keith T. Poole and Howard 
Rosenthal, D-Nominate after 10 Years: A Comparative Update to Congress: A Political-
Economic History of Roll-Call Voting , 26 LEG. STUD. QTLY. 5 (2001). 
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Miller (D-GA), no Democrat is as conservative as the most liberal 
Republican.51 
The inevitable result of such an ideological divide is party 
polarization. Measures of party polarization in both the House and 
Senate reveal an ever-growing ideological gap separating the two 
parties.52 Correspondingly, there is no meaningful ideological range 
within either the Democratic or Republican Party.53 For example, the 
gap between Northern and Southern members of the two parties had 
largely disappeared by 1990.54 In contrast, there was a sharp North-
South (as opposed to Democrat-Republican) divide during the Civil 
Rights era of the 1960s.55 
This ideological divide, which has increased every year since 
1980, shows no signs of letting up. The reason: outside of presidential 
elections, Democrats and Republicans are not interested in appealing 
to centrist voters. Even though the number of centrist voters remains 
fairly stable,56 political parties have discounted these voters for two 
 
 51. 108th Senate Rank Ordering at http://voteview.com/sen108.htm (last updated Oct. 26, 
2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 52.  See Senate: Party Polarization 1st to 107th Congresses at http://voteview.com/ 
Senate_polarization_1789-2002.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (depicting the growing divide between the two parties in the Senate); House: Party 
Polarization 1st to 107th Congresses at http://voteview.com/House_polarization_1789-2002.htm 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (same). 
 53. I do not mean to suggest, however, that there are never divisions within the parties. For 
example, in 2002 the pro-life contingent of the GOP stopped bankruptcy reform from passing 
despite the business lobby’s (and the party leadership’s) huge push for it. Philip Shenon, Anti-
Abortion Lobbyists Tying Up Bankruptcy-Overhaul Bill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2002, at A22. At 
the same time, battles within the Democratic or Republican Party are unusual.  
 54. Roberts & Smith, supra note 46, at 306. 
 55. See The Ideological Structure of Congressional Voting at http://voteview.com/ 
ideological_maps.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(discussing and providing spatial maps of this geographic divide).  
 56. In fact, today’s voters are less likely to identify themselves with one or another political 
party. See Morris P. Fiorina, Whatever Happened to the Median Voter? 13 (1999) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (suggesting that, as a whole, the country is not 
as partisan today as it was in the 1950s). At the same time, voters who identify the mselves with 
one or the other political party are more partisan today than ever before. Consequently, even 
though “the social attitudes of groups in civil society have converged,” attitudes of Americans 
who identify with one or the other political party have polarized. Paul DiMaggio et al., Have 
American Social Attitudes Become More Polarized? , 102 AM. J. SOC. 690, 738 (1996). For 
example, a comparison of surveys of hot-button political issues reveals that the “issue opinions” 
of voters have become increasingly correlated with their party identification. Gary C. Jacobson, 
Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection, in POLARIZED POLITICS: 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA 5, 17–18 (Jon R. Bond & Richard Fle isher 
eds., 2000); see also Katharine Q. Seelye & Marjorie Connelly, Delegates Leaning to Right of 
G.O.P. and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004, at 15-1 (reporting the results of a poll 
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reasons. First, with only one-half of eligible voters actually voting, 
there is greater emphasis on mobilizing the more partisan base.57 
Second (and more significantly), computer-driven redistricting has 
resulted in the drawing of district lines that essentially guarantee that 
each party will win particular seats in the House of Representatives.58 
In other words, the party primary controls who will win the election 
and, as such, candidates have incentive to appeal to partisans who 
vote in the primaries.59 
Increasing emphasis on the party primary and, with it, the need 
to appeal to partisan voters has contributed to several significant 
changes in Congress. Most significantly, as already noted, there is 
much greater cohesion within the Democratic and Republican 
parties.60 Retiring legislators have been replaced by new ones who are 
both more ideological and more loyal to their party.61 Equally 
significant is that incumbent legislators have altered their voting 
patterns to facilitate party unity.62 
Party leaders, especially in the House, have capitalized on the 
fact that lawmakers are more apt to see themselves as members of a 
party, not as independent power brokers. Through party caucuses, 
speaker-appointed task forces, and other techniques, party leaders 
have played an ever-growing role in shaping the party’s agenda.63 
 
indicating that Republican delegates to the 2004 National Convention are more conservative 
than other Republicans).  
 57. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in American 
Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415,  426 (2004); Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft’s Ascent, NEW 
YORKER, Apr. 15, 2002, at 50 (discussing the claim by President Bush’s advisor Karl Rove that 
Republican victories are tied to the party’s bringing religious conservatives to the polls). 
 58. See Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 428–31 (linking redistricting to both partisanship and 
noncompetitive races in the House of Representatives); Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 459, 477–78 (2004) (highlighting the noncompetitiveness of House races and the 
corresponding ease with which incumbents win reelection). 
 59. See Fiorina, supra note 56, at 13–14 (noting that the greatest increase in polarization is 
in caucus and party primary electorates). 
 60. See supra notes 53–54. 
 61. Roberts & Smith, supra  note 46, at 313. Although it may not appear intuitive, the shift 
to more ideologically motivated legislators is partly the result of the polarizing effects of 
redistricting. Professors Jason Roberts and Steven Smith found that these new legislators were 
more willing to vote along party lines than the legislators they replaced. Id. 
 62. Id. at 314 (noting the positive correlation between incumbents switching positions to 
match party positions and increased activism of party leaders). 
 63. See SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUSES IN NATIONAL POLICY 
MAKING 87–92 (1998) (noting the impact of party caucuses on Congress’s agenda); DAVID W. 
RHODE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 35 (1991) (depicting party 
leaders as agents of the party caucus); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW 
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Correspondingly, party leaders are increasingly concerned with 
“message politics,” that is, with using the legislative process to make a 
symbolic statement to voters and other constituents.64 Rather than 
allowing decentralized committees to define Congress’s agenda, 
Democrats and Republicans alike see the lawmaking process as a way 
to stand behind a unified party message and, in this way, to 
distinguish their party from the other.65 
Party cohesion and the corresponding shift of power to party 
leaders dovetails with changes in how lawmakers run for office. 
Specifically, by increasingly looking to party leaders both to set the 
party’s agenda and to dictate how party-line votes should be cast, 
lawmakers have additional time to campaign for reelection.66 Today’s 
lawmakers strengthen their position with their constituents by 
“visit[ing] their districts and states extremely frequently (often three 
or four times a month). They and their staffs devote much of their 
time to constituency casework (with roughly one-third of members’ 
staffs based in their district).”67 By investing in their home districts 
and states, lawmakers trade off time that they otherwise would spend 
 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 132 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing House Speaker 
Dennis Hastert’s (R-IL) convening of a party task force to make an end run around committee 
deliberations over the 1999 Patient’s Bill of Rights).  
 64. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in 
CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 219 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 
2000).  
 65. In the House, committee leaders have more power for another reason. During the 
1990s, Republican party leaders shifted power away from standing committees and toward 
majority party leadership. See generally Steven S. Smith & Eric D. Lawrence, Party Control of 
Committees in the Republican Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence C. Dodd & 
Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 6th ed. 1997) (discussing this phenomenon and explaining why 
party leaders exercise more control in the centralized House than in the decentralized Senate). 
During the 1980s, Democrats also shifted power away from committee leaders. In an effort to 
countermand Republican control of the White House, Democratic members supported party 
leaders’ efforts to alter bills after they came out of committee. This practice, known as 
postcommittee adjustment, was intended to give Democratic leaders control over Congress’s 
work product.  SINCLAIR, supra  note 63, at 93; see also Barbara Sinclair, The Emergence of 
Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives, 54 J. POL. 657, 668 (1992) (explaining 
how greater party unity facilitated efforts by Democratic leaders to speak with the party’s 
voice). 
 66. I do not mean to sug gest that lawmakers think that the party agenda does not serve the 
public interest. Ideological polarization, by definition, means that party members are apt to 
agree with each other and, as such, be in sync with their party leaders. See Sinclair, supra  
note 65, at 668 (suggesting that in the 1980s, the Democratic Party’s increased homogenization 
reduced internal party conflict). 
 67. ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCARED: WHY AMERICA’S POLITICIANS CAMPAIGN TOO 
MUCH AND GOVERN TOO LITTLE 49 (1997). 
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legislating. Likewise, as former representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) 
explained in 1998, members “must spend a disproportionate amount 
of time fund-raising” and, consequently, have less time “discussing 
the issues and less time with colleagues forging legislation and 
monitoring federal bureaucrats.”68 
Today’s lawmakers, as this discussion suggests, spend less time 
sorting out their policy preferences through committee work. Because 
they are more partisan, they are more likely to know their mind 
before the start of committee deliberations. Because their personal 
views are likely to be in sync with those of other members of their 
party, they are more likely to embrace party governance and, in so 
doing, look for signals from party leaders.69 Because they invest more 
time in reelection and constituent service, they are likely to spend less 
time engaging in policy debates with their colleagues, committee staff, 
and personal staff. For reasons I will now detail, these changes in 
Congress have dramatically altered the role of the academic expert 
before congressional committees. 
The Academic Expert and Congressional Committees. How has 
congressional committee consideration of constitutional questions 
been affected by party polarization and the increasing emphasis on 
reelection and constituent service? Let me suggest two ways, both of 
which bear on the role of the academic witness before Congress. First, 
Congress is somewhat less interested in holding hearings on 
constitutional questions. Second, when congressional committees 
hold hearings on constitutional issues, Congress is less likely to invite 
nonpartisan academic witnesses. 
That Congress would hold fewer and fewer hearings on 
constitutional issues is tied, in part, to party polarization and 
increasing appeals to the party base. Members are both more 
ideological and less trusting of the other party. Correspondingly, 
members are far more interested in advancing a particular policy 
agenda than in sorting out the constitutionality of their handiwork.70 
 
 68. See 144 CONG. REC. E1668 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1998). There is a certain irony in 
lawmakers shifting more and more attention to reelection at the very time that redistricting 
ensures that there are next to no competitive races in the House of Representatives. See supra 
note 58 and accompanying text. 
 69. See Ortiz, supra note 58, at 480.   
 70. I do not mean to suggest, however, that party polarization is the only factor that affects 
lawmakers’ interest in constitutional questions. The national policy agenda, for example, also 
influences the number of constitutionally oriented hearings. In the early 1970s, Watergate and 
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Moreover, by focusing their efforts on the message that their party is 
sending, lawmakers place less emphasis on whether federal courts will 
uphold legislation after it is enacted.71 
Increasing lawmaker emphasis on constituent service and 
reelection also contributes to declining lawmaker interest in 
constitutional questions. No constituency values Congress’s 
institutional interest in independently interpreting the Constitution. 
Instead, voters, interest groups, and political parties care about their 
substantive policy agendas.72 Lawmakers therefore have little to gain 
by defending Congress’s power as an independent interpreter of the 
Constitution.73 
Consistent with the above analysis, lawmakers increasingly 
delegate their power of constitutional review to the courts. For 
example, expedited Supreme Court review provisions allow 
lawmakers to enact favored legislation without seriously considering 
the constitutionality of their handiwork.74 More telling, a recent 
opinion poll of members of the 106th Congress (1999–2001) reveals 
that the vast majority of lawmakers adhere to a “joint 
constitutionalist” perspective whereby courts should give either 
 
civil rights were dominant issues. Not surprisingly, Congress held an unusually large number of 
constitutional hearings at that time. Whittington, Devins, & Hicken, supra note 43, at 23. 
 71. That is not to say that lawmakers only care about staking out positions that back up 
party views or bolster their position with voters. It is to say that today’s lawmakers, as compared 
to the lawmakers in Congress from 1968–1985, are less interested in sorting out the 
constitutionality of their handiwork. For these and other reasons, Professors Beth Garrett and 
Adrian Vermuele have proposed structural reforms that will facilitate lawmaker consideration 
of constitutional issues. See generally Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermule, Institutional Design 
of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277 (2001).  
 72. See Neal Devins, The Rehnquist Court: The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. 
U. L. REV. 131,  135  (2004) (explaining that lawmakers are willing to sacrifice federalism and the 
separation of powers when pursuing substantive policies). 
 73. This phenomenon is a variation of the “collective action” problem that pits the 
individual interests of members of Congress against Congress’s institutional interests. 
Specifically, although each of Congress’s 535 members have some stake in preserving its 
institutional prerogatives, lawmakers regularly trade off Congress’s institutional interest in 
order to pursue favored policies. See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential 
Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 144 (1999).  
 74. For a discussion of these provisions, see Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How 
Lawmakers Spurred on the Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 442–44 (2001).  
See also, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81 
(providing special expedited review for challenges brought on constitutional grounds). 
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“limited” or “no weight” to congressional assessments of the 
constitutionality of legislation.75 
The practices of congressional committees likewise reveal 
diminishing lawmaker interest in constitutional questions.76 Data 
collected from 1971 to 2000 shows that there has been a decline in 
congressional committee hearings on constitutional questions.77 
Committees that once paid significant attention to constitutional 
issues, including foreign relations and education, experienced a 
noticeable drop in the number of constitutionally oriented hearings.78 
Indeed, outside of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, no 
congressional committee regularly considers constitutional questions. 
An equally telling manifestation of committee practices is Congress’s 
response to 1990s Rehnquist Court decisions invalidating federal 
statutes. Between 1995 and 2000, the Rehnquist Court struck down all 
or part of twenty-three statutes, and, in so doing, revived federalism-
based limits on congressional power.79 These decisions, however, did 
not trigger renewed congressional interest in the Constitution. From 
1990 to 1999, the number of constitutionally oriented hearings 
declined.80 And although Congress occasionally held hearings to 
explore the ramifications of the Court’s decisions, lawmakers seemed 
indifferent to the fact that the Court’s revival of federalism was 
limiting congressional power.81 
 
 75. Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes Towards Constitutional Interpretation, in 
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 83, on file with the Duke Law Journal). Nonetheless, more than 60 percent of 
lawmakers who responded to Professor Peabody’s survey think that Congress ought to 
independently evaluate constitutional questions. Id. 
 76. Congressional committees are where “[m]uch of the important work of Congress is 
done,” as they are the primary sites on which Congress both deliberates and legislates. Keith E. 
Whittington, Hearing about the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in CONGRESS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 75, at 147, 147. As such, congressional efforts to interpret the 
Constitution are very much tied to the work of committees. For a useful treatment of the ways 
in which party leaders work with congressional committees in shaping the legislative agenda, see 
John H. Aldrich & David W. Rhode, Congressional Committees in a Partisan Era (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 77. Whittington, Devins, & Hicken, supra note 43, at 6, 19–20 (reporting data about both 
the total number of hearings on the constitutionality of legislation and the number of 
constitutional hearings in several specific committees).  
 78. Id. 
 79. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Judiciary: The Tipping Point, 32 NAT’L J. 1810, 1811 (2000). 
 80. See Whittington, Devins, & Hicken, supra note 43, at 19–20. 
 81. Congress’s blasé attitude toward the Supreme Court’s hostility to congressional 
decisionmaking is tied to changing lawmaker practices. Most significantly, lawmakers were able 
to advance constituent interests by making use of alternative sources of power. Because  there is 
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Congress’s uninterest in defending its institutional turf and, more 
generally, the diminishing importance of the Constitution to Congress 
has also had an impact on the types of witnesses that Congress calls to 
testify on constitutional questions. An increasingly ideological, 
increasingly polarized Congress has little to gain by hearing from 
nonpartisan witnesses. Instead, with each party engaged in a 
“perpetual campaign[] through confrontation,”82 hearings are 
opportunities for one or the other side to explain its views to the 
public. As such, each party will want to hear from witnesses who will 
back up its positions. Today’s witnesses, in other words, may be more 
readily identifiable with one or another party than witnesses in earlier 
eras.83 And when witnesses are not identifiable with one of the 
 
no discrete constituency pushing la wmakers to value Congress’s power to interpret the 
Constitution, lawmakers saw no reason to strike back at the Court. See id. at 23. (discussing this 
phenomenon). Furthermore, several of the bills struck down were “expressive,” that is, 
lawmakers supported the bill to send a message to constituents, not to accomplish a particular 
programmatic objective. See id. at 24 (discussing the rise of message politics); see also Keith E. 
Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 477, 513 (2001) (explaining that the Rehnquist Court did not pay a political price for 
invalidating “position taking” legislation on federalism grounds, and, in so doing, quoting a 
definition of “position taking” legislation from DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE 
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 62 (1974)). For a discussion of why neither the American people nor 
elected officials (state as well as federal) care about federalism, see Devins, supra note 74,  
at 448. 
 82. DONALD R. WOLFENSBEGER, CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE: DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 270 (2000).  
 83. Many of the academic experts who testify before Congress have held positions with 
Democratic or Republican administrations. Others have worked for interest groups whose views 
are closely allied with one or the other party. That is not to say that they are not experts, nor is 
it to say that they are not stating their views when testifying. At the same time, these witnesses 
understand that they are being called on by their political party to testify in ways that strengthen 
the position of their party. 
To test this proposition, I selected three academics who had worked in Republican or 
Democratic administrations (two Republicans and one Democrat, to reflect the fact that 
Republicans currently control Congress). Each of these three—John McGinnis, Vicki Jackson, 
and Douglas Kmiec—had testified before Congress on at least two occasions since 2000. I 
identified the number of hearings in which at least one of these three scholars had testified (nine 
total) and determined the number of academics who had testified at these hearings (twenty-
three total). The results are striking: fifteen of the twenty-three who testified had worked for 
either Democratic or Republican administrations (twelve Republican, two Democratic, one who 
worked for both but had recently consulted the George W. Bush administration). Of the 
remaining eight, two had worked with ideologically identifiable interest groups (one 
conservative, one liberal). Not surprisingly, these witnesses overwhelmingly testified in support 
of positions consistent with the party or interest group they had worked for. Let me hasten to 
add, however: I know many of these individuals and I think that their reputations are beyond 
reproach. The phenomenon I identify calls attention to Congress’s interests in reaching out to 
witnesses who have ties to one of the parties, identifiable views, or both (based, in part, on their 
012306 04_DEVINS .DOC  2/6/2006   10:19 AM 
2005] ACADEMIC EXPERT BEFORE CONGRESS 1543 
parties, it may be that committee staff have spoken to these witnesses 
in sufficient detail to know what they will say.84 
Consider, for example, the practices of the Senate Judiciary and 
Foreign Relations Committees.85 Each of these committees has strict 
rules allocating the number of witnesses that the majority and 
minority party may call.86 Needless to say, in this era of polarized 
politics, party staff often use these slots to advance the agenda of the 
committee’s chair or ranking minority member.87 As compared to the 
1970s (when several Senate committees made use of unified staffs and 
operated in a bipartisan way), today’s hearings often operate as 
“formalized press conference[s]” in which each side seeks to bolster 
its case.88 Indeed, today’s hearings can be analogized to a trial. Expert 
witnesses are called to fortify preexisting views or to rebut the other 
side’s experts. Nonpartisan experts cannot be counted on to support 
one or the other side and, consequently, are “deselected.”89 
I do not mean to suggest that today’s lawmakers never see 
hearings as an opportunity to educate themselves. Nor am I 
suggesting that the 1970s was a golden age, in which all hearings were 
bipartisan searches for truth. Nevertheless, today’s hearings reflect 
party polarization and, as such, are more likely to showcase 
Republican and Democratic witnesses whose testimony matches the 
preexisting views of party leaders. Unlike the period before 1985 
(when committee and subcommittee chairs were generally 
 
work with interest groups). For an inventory of witnesses and hearings, see Memorandum from 
Aaron Kimbler to Professor Neal Devins (Nov. 5, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 84. When I was called on to testify on proposed item veto legislation, for example, 
committee staff asked me whether my testimony would match my writings on the item veto. I 
have heard similar stories from others. 
 85. Claims made in this paragraph are based on interviews with John Yoo, Professor of 
Law, University of California, Berkeley School of Law and general counsel to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee from 1995 to 1996, and Michael Glennon, Professor of International Law, 
Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy, Tufts University and legal counsel to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee from 1979 to 1980.  
 86. Id. 
 87. The more polarizing the issue, the more likely it is that the process will operate as an 
effort to strengthen the preexisting views of the majority party over those of the minority. On 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, for example, issues such as gay rights, abortion, and school 
prayer were especially polarizing. In contrast, technical issues were less polarizing. On 
Sentencing Guidelines, for example, social scientists were brought in to educate the committee 
and its staff. These hearings were less polarized and, consequently, operated more as a search 
for truth. Interview with John Yoo, supra note 85. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Interview with Michael Glennon, supra note 85. 
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conciliatory toward the minority in both agenda control and witness 
selection),90 today’s hearings are often “orchestrated,” “stage-
managed” events showcasing witnesses who will reinforce the views 
of the party that asked them to testify.91 
When it comes to constitutional law experts, moreover, it is 
especially likely that party polarization will impact the selection of 
witnesses. These witnesses are not reporting on empirical studies that 
they have conducted; instead, they are making arguments grounded 
in contested theories of interpretation.92 These arguments, moreover, 
are often on hot-button issues that divide the two parties.93 And 
because there is rarely an academic consensus on these issues, 
committee staffers can always find what they are looking for—a 
constitutional law expert who will back their position. 
Against this backdrop, it is quite understandable that 
congressional staff would no longer use one of their valuable chits on 
a nonpartisan expert like Bill Van Alstyne. Not only did Van Alstyne 
fail to line up behind one or the other party, he rarely presented 
testimony that one or the other side would consider a slam dunk. He 
would reveal conflicts between his personal views and his 
constitutional opinions; his analysis would sometimes note strengths 
and weaknesses of competing arguments.94 In contrast, majority and 
minority staff are increasingly interested in putting on advocates for 
their party’s position. 
The question remains: in addition to the changes in Congress 
detailed in this Part, have there been corresponding changes in the 
 
 90. See Christine DeGregario, Leadership Approaches in Congressional Committee 
Hearings, 45 W. POL. Q. 971, 980 (1992).  
 91. ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER OLSZEK, CONGRESS & ITS MEMBERS 214–15 (9th 
ed. 2004) (“Hearings, in brief, are often orchestrated as a form of political the atre . . . .”); 
Richard E. Cohen, Crackup of the Committees, 32 NAT’L. J. 2210, 2215 (1999) (“In recent years, 
a growing number of members seeking to learn about issues have often found committee 
hearings so stage-managed as to be useless.”). 
 92. For an argument that academic expe rts who rely on “soft” normative arguments 
provide less useful information to lawmakers than experts whose testimony is based on “hard” 
empirical evidence, see Ward Farnsworth, Talking Out of School: Notes on the Transmission of 
Intellectual Capital from the Legal Academy to Public Tribunals, 81 B.U. L. REV. 13, 24–25 
(2001); see also supra  note 87 (discussing how Senate Judiciary Committee hearings featuring 
social scientists were less politicized). 
 93. Van Alstyne’s numerous appearances before Congress bolster this claim. Abortion, 
affirmative action, impeachment, war powers, and the confirmation of controversial judicial and 
executive branch nominees are hot-button issues that divide the parties. See supra Part I 
(detailing Van Alstyne’s appearances before congressional committees).  
 94. See supra Part I. 
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academy? This Part explains why today’s Congress is especially 
interested in finding witnesses that would back up one or the other 
party. But has the legal academy changed in ways that facilitate 
lawmaker efforts to increasingly turn hearings into “formalized press 
conferences”? Correspondingly, do today’s academics embrace Bill 
Van Alstyne’s views on what it means to be an academic expert? The 
next and final Part of this Essay explores these questions. 
III.  PROFESSORS AND POLITICS 
Today’s academics seem more political than academics at other 
times. In part, the politicization of congressional committees explains 
this phenomenon. With Republicans and Democrats “deselecting” 
witnesses who will not say what they want to hear,95 academic 
witnesses may be seen as willing participants in a partisan process. 
Correspondingly, the increasing tendency of Republican and 
Democratic staffers to call witnesses with political ties to their party 
signals that many academic witnesses have strong loyalties to one or 
the other party. Moreover, today’s academics, as compared to 1968–
1985 (when Van Alstyne regularly testified before congressional 
committees), are far more likely to stake out positions on divisive 
political issues by taking out full page advertisements in major 
newspapers and signing onto joint letters to Congress.96 In so doing, 
the legal academics who have spearheaded these efforts have 
articulated a vision of academic expertise that diverges from Van 
Alstyne’s call for academics to “answer at a professional level for the 
ethical integrity of [their] work.”97 And although today’s academics 
almost certainly believe in the truthfulness of the assertions they 
make in congressional statements, joint letters, and advertisements, it 
also seems likely that today’s academics would not find it surprising 
to be labeled a Democratic or Republican expert. 
There are several prominent examples of today’s academics 
speaking out on policy issues. One is an advertisement signed by 554 
law professors attacking the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. 
 
 95. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 96. Following the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore decision, for example, 554 law professors 
took out an advertisement in The New York Times “protest[ing ]” the decision and arguing that 
“[b]y taking power from voters, the Supreme Court has tarnished its own legitimacy.” 
Advertisement, 554 Law Professors Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7 (placed by People for 
the American Way). 
 97. Van Alstyne, supra  note 2, at 76.  
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Gore.98 The joint letters to Congress on the Clinton impeachment are 
another example: one (signed by 450) concluded that Clinton did not 
commit any impeachable offensives and another (signed by 96) 
reached the opposite conclusion. The joint letters on whether the 
Senate should confirm Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork are a 
third; one (signed by 2,000) opposed the nomination and another 
(signed by 100) supported Judge Bork. Other examples include a 
joint letter by law professors and other academics opposing gun 
control legislation and a joint letter signed by more than 300 law 
professors urging Congress to address coercive interrogation 
techniques in Iraq.99 
The frequency with which today’s academics send such missives 
to Congress is a dramatic departure from past practices. Since 1986, 
academics have sent at least thirty letters to Congress. From 1968 to 
1985, in contrast, there are hardly any examples of joint letters to 
Congress.100 Academics wrote letters opposing both the Carswell 
Supreme Court nomination and legislation that would have declared 
that life begins at conception.101 I could not, however, locate joint 
letters on the Vietnam War, the Nixon impeachment, or school 
busing. 
 
 98. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also supra note 96. 
 99. For a news story about the Iraq letter, see Risheng Xu, Law Professors Draft Petition 
on Iraq Abuse, THE HARVARD CRIMSON, June 8, 2004, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/ 
article.aspx?ref=502751. For descriptions of the other letters, see Neal Devins, Bearing False 
Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and the Future of Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
165, 166–79 (1999); John McGinnis et al., Ideology in the Elite Legal Academy: A Preliminary 
Investigation, 93 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 30–34, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal).  
 100. I relied principally on law review articles in conducting this research, and it may be that 
I failed to uncover some of the joint letters submitted to Congress. At the same time, the gap 
between the pre- and post-1986 period is so stark as to suggest a dramatic shift in academic 
letter writing. Devins, supra note 99, at 166–79, and McGinnis et al., supra note 99, at 30–34, 
reference several of the post-1986 letters.  
 101. The Carswell letter is discussed in William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the 
Federal Judicial Selection Process, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1990). Like many of today’s joint 
letters, the Carswell letter was signed by numerous scholars (“ [h]undreds of law professors”), 
many of whom did not teach or write about the issues discussed in the letter. See id. at 21 n.109 
(noting four schools in which at least 19 (and as many as 35) faculty signed the letter). In 
contrast, the human life letter was signed by a handpicked, ideologically diverse group of eleven 
constitutional law scholars. See also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Bill to Ban Abortions is Assailed by 
Scholars as Unconstitutional, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1981, at A25. For that reason, Bill Van 
Alstyne favorably references that letter in his test imony on human life legislation. See Human 
Life Bill Hearings, supra note 26, at 275–76. 
012306 04_DEVINS .DOC  2/6/2006   10:19 AM 
2005] ACADEMIC EXPERT BEFORE CONGRESS 1547 
The willingness of today’s academics to play a more overtly 
political role, in part, speaks to changes in the legal academy’s 
understanding of what it means to be an academic.102 Over time, the 
traditional image of the academic as dispassionate truth seeker gave 
way to postmodernism, critical legal studies, and, more generally, the 
belief that constitutional arguments “can be manipulated to advance 
the particular policy goal of the advocate who makes them.”103 By 
1986 (the very time that Congress became less interested in hearing 
from Bill Van Alstyne), this belief helped fuel law professor efforts to 
back up favored positions by signing joint letters.104 Correspondingly, 
these letter writing campaigns signaled to lawmakers and committee 
staffers that many law professors were willing to play their part in 
advancing the political goals of one or the other party. Indeed, law 
professors worked in tandem with members of Congress in organizing 
several letter writing campaigns.105 
Further reflecting changes in the academy, today’s academics 
seem to embrace a more flexible standard of what it means to be an 
academic expert than the one enunciated by Bill Van Alstyne. 
Consider, for example, the arguments of Professors Cass Sunstein 
 
 102. A vivid illustration (albeit well before Van Alstyne’s time) of earlier academic practices 
is the law professor response to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Court -packing proposal. See 
generally Kyle Graham, A Moment in Time: Law Professors and the Court-Packing Plan, 52 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 151 (2002). A handful of faculty at Harvard, Chicago, and Northwestern law 
schools submitted joint letters opposing the plan. Id. at 158. But a more systemic effort launched 
by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS) fizzled. Id. at 159. At that time, many law 
professors (even those who saw law as a “social institution”) believed that academics must 
“foster a perception of nonpartisanship” and, consequently, that “overt political action 
threatened the law school’s reputation as a disinterested body of scholars.” Id. at 155. And 
although norms in the legal academy were beginning to change, the AALS effort was in tension 
with existing practices. 
 103. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 90 (1996). 
 104. A statistical analysis of law professors who both contribute to political campaigns and 
sign joint letters demonstrates that partisan beliefs (liberal or conservative) figure prominently 
in the decision to sign a joint letter. McGinnis et al., supra note 99, at 30. And although some 
academics are willing to cross party lines to defend principles that matter to them, it is also true 
that academics are more willing now than ever before to see their communications with 
Congre ss as an opportunity to advance policy preferences. See id. at 33 (noting that 4 of 114 law 
professors who contribute to one or the other party signed letters taking issue with their party’s 
position). 
 105. See NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE 
BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 143 (1998) (discussing the 
coordination between law professors and members of Congress regarding a letter on Bork’s 
Supreme Court nomination); Devins, supra note 99, at 180 (same with respect to an anti-
impeachment letter); id. at 179 (same for intelligence spending). 
012306 04_DEVINS .DOC  2/6/2006  10:19 AM 
1548 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1525 
(who helped organize a letter opposing the impeachment of President 
Bill Clinton) and Steve Griffin (who organized a letter to the Florida 
legislature, calling upon them to follow the Florida Supreme Court 
opinion in Bush v. Gore). For Cass Sunstein, it was not at all 
problematic that most of the law professors who signed his 
impeachment letter did not teach constitutional law. Instead, 
recognizing that “[e]very signature really counts,”106 Sunstein thought 
it enough that these professors “believed that they knew enough—
from training and from substantive conversations with colleagues—to 
have a reasonably informed opinion” about the issue.107 In other 
words, the key question—as Sunstein puts it—is whether these 
professors “thought, in good faith, that they knew enough about the 
[issue].”108 
For Steve Griffin (who limited signatories of his letter to 
professors of constitutional law), it was not important whether the 
professor had familiarity with the issues before the Florida court and 
Florida legislature. It was enough, instead, that the signatories simply 
have “the ability, common among constitutional scholars, to create 
and evaluate constitutional arguments.”109 For this reason, Griffin 
included in his letter soliciting signatures the following plea: “Sign or 
not, but don’t fail to sign because you feel you are not an expert. That 
is a formula for the abdication of public responsibility by scholars 
who ought to know better.”110 
These arguments are very different than Van Alstyne’s claim 
that academic experts have a fiduciary duty to maintain “standard[s] 
of professional integrity,”111 including the obligation to make sure that 
other academics are making “ethical use of [their] academic 
freedom.”112 Unlike Van Alstyne, Professors Sunstein and Griffin do 
not think it necessary that academics who hold themselves out as 
 
 106. Devins, supra note 99, at 173 (quoting E-mail from Cass Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn 
Dist. Service Prof. of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago, to Neal Devins, Goodrich Professor 
of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary (Oct. 29, 1998)). 
 107. Cass R. Sunstein, Professors and Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 195 (1999).  
 108. Id. 
 109. Stephen M. Griffin, Scholars and Public Debates: A Reply to Devins and Farnsworth, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 227, 231 (2002). 
 110. Id. at 256 n.128 (quoting Posting of Stephen M. Griffin, sgriffin@law.tulane.edu, to 
conlawprof@listserv.ucla.edu (Dec. 5, 2000)). In making this plea, Griffin argued that academics 
ought not to bow to pressure from academics, like myself, who enunciate a more demanding 
standard of academic expertise. For my reply to Griffin, see Devins, supra note 99. 
 111. Van Alstyne, supra  note 2, at 71. 
 112. Id. at 76. 
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constitutional experts should actually study the issues on which they 
comment. In particular, neither Sunstein nor Griffin ask that 
academics who hold themselves out as constitutional experts actually 
study the issue on which they comment. Instead, it is enough that they 
engage in substantive conversations with colleagues and/or are 
familiar with the modes of constitutional argumentation. 
That today’s academics embrace a relaxed definition of academic 
expertise corresponds to the increasing willingness of legal academics 
to make use of newspaper advertisements and letter writing 
campaigns to stake out expert opinions that comport with their 
personal beliefs.113 Changes in academic practices and changes in 
Congress are also mutually reinforcing. Just as lawmakers have lost 
interest in hearing from nonpartisan experts on questions of 
constitutional interpretation, academics increasingly embrace a 
definition of academic expertise that allows individuals to register 
partisan preferences without studying the relevant literature. 
Against this backdrop, it is easy to understand why today’s 
academics would see their testimony as helping one or another 
political party. Congress has changed in ways that make it far more 
likely that academic testimony will be solicited for purely partisan 
purposes. More than that, the academy has changed in ways that 
suggest that academics are more willing than ever before to be part of 
such an overtly partisan process. 
Although partisan politics also figured into earlier hearings,114 
the increasing partisan polarization in academic attitudes and in 
lawmakers’ desires have becoming mutually reinforcing phenomena. 
The more that academics stake out positions on divisive issues before 
Congress, the more lawmakers seek out reliable Democratic or 
Republican witnesses (and vice versa). For this very reason, it is to be 
expected that Van Alstyne’s writings on academic expertise would be 
less salient in today’s politicized academy.115 
 
 113. See supra note 104 (noting the correlation between political contributions and positions 
staked out in academic letter writing campaigns). 
 114. Consider, for example, the confirmation hearing of Supreme Court nominee Harold 
Carswell. As suggested earlier, there was a sharp split between Democratic and Republican 
Senators. See supra notes 17–18. It is also the case that at least one pre-1986 letter writing 
campaign allowed academics to register their personal preferences. See supra note 101 
(discussing academic opposition to Carswell’s confirmation). 
 115. I do not mean to suggest, however, that academics who testify before Congress are 
neither well prepared nor sincere. I think that they are. I also think, for reasons detailed in Parts 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
By calling attention to changes in Congress and the academy, this 
Essay has tried to make sense of the diminishing appeal of 
unpredictable, nonpartisan witnesses to congressional committees. 
Today’s Congress is far more partisan than it was from 1968 to 1985, 
when Bill Van Alstyne regularly appeared before congressional 
committees.116 As such, the party who calls academic witnesses wants 
to make sure that their testimony will back up preexisting party 
positions. For its part, the academy has become more politicized. 
Today’s academics are more likely to make use of joint letters, 
newspaper advertisements, and the like to send a political message to 
lawmakers and to the American people. Furthermore, when signing 
these letters and advertisements, academics often make use of a 
relaxed definition of what constitutes academic expertise. 
From my vantage point, this state of affairs is unfortunate. Bill 
Van Alstyne’s testimony before Congress exemplifies what academic 
testimony should be: expert, nonpartisan, and consistently employing 
a distinctive methodology. Notwithstanding my disappointment in 
changes both in Congress and the academy, I must say that I feel very 
grateful to have had a chance to survey Van Alstyne’s extraordinary 
contribution to constitutional discourse in Congress. 
 
II and III of this Essay, that they are more readily identifiable with one or the other political 
party. 
 116. In understanding why this is so, I have highlighted three interrelated phenomena, 
namely, increasing party polarization, the accompanying growth of party leadership, and 
changes in how lawma kers run for office. 
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APPENDIX A  
 
Hearings at which Bill Van Alstyne Testified, and Corresponding 
Writings: 
 
The Supreme Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation 
of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 163–204 
(1968). 
· A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 
(1973). 
· Panel Discussion, Legislation to Limit the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 96 F.R.D. 275 (1983). 
 
George Harrold Carswell: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 133–38 (1970). 
 
To Reduce the Compensation of the Office of Attorney General: 
Hearing on S. 2673 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong. 47–67 (1973). 
 
Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing on S. 407, S. 
903, S. 1297, S. 1409, and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th 
Cong. 789–802 (1975). 
· The Fourteenth Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the 
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 33. 
· The Administration’s Anti-Literacy Test Bill: Wholly 
Constitutional But Wholly Inadequate, 61 MICH. L. REV. 805 
(1963). 
 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 54–86 (1976). 
· Academic Freedom and Tenure: The Enlargement of the 
Classified Information System, ACADEME, Jan.–Feb. 1983, at 
9a. 
· The University at Odds with Itself: Furtive Surveillance on 
Campus, ACADEME, Mar.–Apr. 1983, at 13a. 
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Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearing on H.J. Res. 638 
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 115–21 (1978). 
· What Do You Think About the Twenty-Seventh Amendment?, 
10 CONST. COMMENT. 9 (1993). 
· Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes of 
Change, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 933. 
· The Proposed Twenty-Seventh Amendment: A Brief, 
Supportive Comment, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 189. 
 
Constitutional Convention Procedures: Hearing on S. 3, S. 520, 
and S. 1710 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 286–302 (1979). 
· The Limited Constitutional Convention—The Recurring 
Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985. 
· Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited 
Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague , 1978 DUKE L.J. 
1295. 
 
Racially Motivated Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 
385–400 (1981). 
 
Affirmative Action and Equal Protection: Hearing on S.J. Res. 41 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 81–94 (1981). 
· A Preliminary Report on the Bakke Case, 64 A.A.U.P. BULL. 
286, 288 (1978).  
· Equality for Individuals or Equality for Groups: Implications 
of the Supreme Court’s Decision in the Manhart Case, 64 
A.A.U.P. BULL. 150, 151 (1978).  
· Affirmative Actions, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1517 (2000). 
· Affirmative Action and Racial Discrimination Under Law: A 
Preliminary Review, 1 SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
TOPICS 180 (United States Commission on Civil Rights 1985). 
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Oversight Hearings to Define the Scope of the Senate ’s Authority 
Under Article III of the Constitution to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 98–135 (1981). 
· A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 
(1973). 
· Panel Discussion, Legislation to Limit the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts, 96 F.R.D. 275 (1983).  
 
The Human Life Bill: Hearing on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong. 275–305 (1981). 
· Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review From Griswold v. 
Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely 
Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677. 
· The Cycle of Constitutional Uncertainty in American Abortion 
Law, in ABORTION, MEDICINE AND THE LAW (J. Butler & D. 
Walbret eds., 4th ed. 1992). 
· Notes on the Marginalization of Marriage in America: Altered 
States in Constitutional Law, in PROBLEMS AND CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY IN A FREE SOCIETY (James 
Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1994). 
 
Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Permit Voluntary Prayer: 
Hearing on S.J. Res 199 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong. 387–468 (1982). 
· If the School Prayer Amendment Becomes Law, LIBERTY 
MAG., 1983, at 4.  
· Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling 
Wall—A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770. 
· What is “An Establishment of Religion”?, 65 N.C. L. REV. 909 
(1987). 
 
Freedom of Expression: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong. 92–112 (1982). 
· The Möbius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red 
Lion, 29 S.C. L. REV. 539 (1978). 
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Constitutional Convention Procedures: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 95–99 (1985). 
· The Limited Constitutional Convention—The Recurring 
Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985. 
· Does Article V Restrict the States to Calling Unlimited 
Conventions Only?—A Letter to a Colleague , 1978 DUKE L.J. 
1295. 
 
Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds to be Associate 
Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 169–170 (1985). 
 
The Constitutional Roles of Congress and the President in 
Declaring and Waging War: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 189–219 (1991). 
· Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A 
Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
· The Constitutionality of the War Powers Act, 43 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 17 (1988). 
· Presidential Ability to Launch an Attack, 148 CONG. REC. S10, 
642–44 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd, 
quoting letter from William Van Alstyne). 
 
Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 237–242 (1998). 
· President Nixon: Toughing it Out with the Law, 59 ABA J. 
1398 (1973). 
· A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. 
Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116 (1974). 
· The Third Impeachment Article: Congressional Bootstrapping, 
60 ABA J. 1199 (1974). 
 
